From Global Strategy to Strategic Compass: Where Is the
EU Heading? Egmont Security Policy Brief No, 121 December 2019 by Biscop, Sven
  
   
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 
No. [ ] 
[Date] 
No. 121 
December 2019 
From Global Strategy to Strategic Compass: Where Is the 
EU Heading?  
Sven Biscop 
Does the EU need a “Strategic Compass” to 
guide the implementation of the security and 
defence dimension of the European Union 
Global Strategy (EUGS)? Does it need a 
military strategy perhaps? And what about a 
review of the EUGS itself? As Josep Borrell 
has assumed the post of High 
Representative, various proposals by 
Member States and EU institutional actors 
are being discussed in Brussels. The wish for 
more strategic documents may reflect the 
complexity of the challenges that the EU is 
facing. It may also result from the inability to 
fully implement existing strategies. 
Producing new documents can be a way of 
forging a deal between Member States on 
foreign policy priorities for the next five years. 
But it could also be window-dressing, 
occupying the machinery and deluding 
ourselves that we are active. How to take EU 
strategy and its implementation forward? 
 
 
For the record (though I know it is unlikely to 
happen today): ideally, the EUGS itself should be 
systematically reviewed and a new edition 
adopted after every European election. The 
EUGS 2016 should be followed by the EUGS 
2020, and so on.  
 
A strategic review is a way of forcing ourselves to 
think about grand strategy at least once every five 
years. Remember that thirteen years elapsed 
between the 2003 European Security Strategy and the 
EUGS, because Member States could not agree 
on the need for a review; rendering it systematic 
would avoid such a deadlock. Sometimes one 
may review the EUGS and decide that not that 
much has to be changed – I would argue that is 
the case today. But then one doesn’t change 
things because one has thought about them; not 
because one has refused to think.  
 
Furthermore, a strategic review at the start of the 
term would be a way for each High 
Representative to craft his/her own mandate and 
set the priorities on which he/she will take the 
lead during the next five years. 
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A MID-TERM REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION   
If, as it now appears, there is no willingness to 
review the EUGS itself, a second-best solution 
would be to assess its implementation.  
 
Care should be taken to avoid the mistakes from 
the past. In 2007, for lack of consensus on a full 
strategic review, the European Council also 
tasked the High Representative with such an 
assessment, but the resulting Report on the 
Implementation of the European Security Strategy 
(December 2008) ended up fumbling the issue. 
The report’s relation to the ESS was never quite 
clear. Formally it did not replace but supplement 
it – which document had priority then? Most 
importantly, the report did not actually offer any 
operational conclusions to take implementation 
forward. Add the fact that the report was badly 
written, and one understands why it was quickly 
forgotten – and the effort wasted.  
 
A “Mid-Term Review of Implementation” of the 
EUGS, as I would propose to call the exercise, 
should be clear in its purpose: not to replace the 
EUGS nor to supplement it, but to assess its 
implementation so far, in all dimensions, and to 
decide on actions to be taken for its 
implementation during the term of the new 
Commission, ideally with an eye to a full strategic 
review of the EUGS itself after the 2024 
elections.  
 
The aim should not be to create a permanent new 
layer of strategy in between the EUGS, our grand 
strategy, and the various existing geographic and 
thematic strategies under the EUGS (on cyber, 
terrorism, maritime security, connectivity, the 
Sahel etc.). There is little added value in 
complicating the hierarchy of documents, but a 
great risk of confusion, for an additional layer 
would inevitably end up deviating from the 
EUGS itself and blur our priorities. The job at 
hand therefore is to make sure that all the current 
specific strategies fit within the choices made in 
the EUGS, and that all of the EUGS is translated 
into specific strategies and, finally, into action. 
 
A TRIPLE TASK LIST 
A “Mid-Term Review of Implementation” 
should do three things, therefore.  
 
1. Honestly assess implementation of the EUGS 
to date. This is not an exercise for public 
consumption, like the June 2019 report The 
European Union's Global Strategy: Three Years on, 
Moving Forward, which (understandably, from the 
point of view of communication) paints a 
positive picture. This internal assessment, 
however, should focus on the shortfalls: what 
have we not done?  
 
2. Decide on specific objectives and ways of 
achieving them during the coming five years for 
each of the five priorities of the EUGS. Through 
this exercise, the High Representative can craft a 
package deal with capitals and create his own 
mandate for a proactive role. In setting specific 
objectives, the existing broad priorities can be 
centred on the most pressing challenges and 
finetuned in accordance with how the 
environment has evolved since the EUGS was 
presented.  
 
3. Identify horizontal issues that have to be taken 
into account when taking action to implement 
each of the five priorities. This is the way, short 
of a full strategic review of the EUGS itself, to 
put new concerns on the agenda or to give more 
prominence to issues that the EUGS did address 
but which have gained in importance since. A 
prime example is the need to position the EU in 
the rivalry between the great powers (the US, 
China, and Russia) as an independent actor that 
forges its own relations with each of the others. 
This view is implicit in the EUGS but needs to be 
rendered more explicit in view of the 
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intensification of great power rivalry (as in the 
March 2019 communication EU-China: A 
Strategic Outlook). Another example is the 2018 
EU-Asia Connectivity Strategy, which also affects all 
five priorities of the EUGS.  
 
As the aim is to foster action and kick-start 
implementation, a “Mid-Term Review of 
Implementation” cannot be too time-consuming. 
It ought to be completed no later than by the June 
2020 European Council. To take more time 
would be to defeat the purpose of the exercise.  
 
A “STRATEGIC COMPASS”?  
One outcome of the third step could be the 
conclusion that for a certain thematic or 
geographic area, a specific strategy is missing. I 
certainly agree that the EU needs more politico-
military guidance. Over the years, political 
guidance for the Common Security and Defence 
Policy (CSDP) has become confused while 
remaining incomplete, and the EU has assumed 
security tasks beyond the CSDP, notably in 
response to hybrid threats. 
 
The Treaty lists the expeditionary tasks of the 
CSDP, to which the EUGS has added the 
protection of Europe itself, even though the 
Treaty does not provide for CSDP operations on 
the territory of the Union. Based on the EUGS, 
the November 2016 Implementation Plan on Security 
and Defence lists three tasks (crisis response, 
capacity-building, and the protection of Europe), 
but the EUGS also emphasises maintaining free 
access to the global commons as a military task. 
Within the task of crisis response, the EUGS 
prioritises the protection of civilians in armed 
conflict, but in reality, Member States undertake 
military operations primarily to safeguard their 
security and economic interests. It is not always 
clear what the purpose of certain tasks is, 
therefore, and the task list itself is confused and 
inherently contradictory.  
Nor is it clear at which scale the EU would be 
willing to implement these tasks, because 
Member States have refused to open the debate 
about the Headline Goal. It is obvious, however, 
that the stated aim (since 1999) of deploying and 
sustaining up to a corps (50 to 60,000 troops) is 
insufficient to implement all the tasks set by the 
EUGS concurrently. At the same time, the 
EUGS has introduced strategic autonomy as an 
objective, but the debate about what that might 
mean in the area of defence is so far inconclusive. 
Simultaneously, in the area of capacity-building, 
Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) 
actually looks beyond the CSDP, addressing the 
entirety of participating Member States’ armed 
forces with the aim of achieving their national, 
NATO and EU targets.  
 
Germany has proposed to write a “Strategic 
Compass” to clarify this conundrum. At the same 
time, the EU Military Staff is working on a 
military contribution to EU strategic thinking.  
 
What is needed is a clear expression of which 
security and defence responsibilities the EU must 
be ready assume, through the CSDP and other 
policies, for which purposes, through which types 
of operations (high and low intensity), at which 
scale and with which concurrency. That means 
answering some sensitive political questions and 
(for the CSDP part) translating the answers into 
precise military objectives. Such a politico-
military “Strategic Compass” should be co-
authored by the civilian and military side of the 
EEAS together, therefore.  
 
In order to really have an impact on the CSDP, 
the “Strategic Compass” should subsequently 
lead to a new Headline Goal. There is no point in 
clarifying the tasks if one is not willing to revisit 
the means accordingly. This new Headline Goal 
can then steer the next iteration of the various 
strands of the EU capability process (Illustrative 
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Scenarios, Progress Catalogue, Capability 
Development Plan etc.) in order to decide which 
“coherent full spectrum force package” we are 
building (to use the term from the November 
2017 PESCO Notification). A package that 
allows EU Member States both to play their role 
within NATO and to act autonomously when 
necessary.  
 
When producing new documents, it is important 
to make clear which old documents they replace. 
If a “Strategic Compass” is adopted, the 2016 
Implementation Plan becomes void.  
 
CONCLUSION: KEEP AN EYE ON THE 
NEEDLE  
“Strategic compass” is not an established term in 
the field of strategy, hence its meaning is not 
intuitively clear. A compass tells you where the 
north is, which is useful – if you know in which 
direction you are heading. In that sense, the 
EUGS itself is our compass, which tells us where 
to go. Many, when they hear the term “Strategic 
Compass”, logically assume that it refers to the 
full scope of the EUGS rather than just security 
and defence.  
 
If Member States would agree to produce a 
politico-military document at the level below the 
EUGS, on a par with the existing thematic and 
geographic strategies, perhaps instead of 
“Strategic Compass” they should simply call it for 
what it is: a “Politico-Military Strategy”.  
A “Politico-Military Strategy” below the EUGS is 
a necessity, but I argue that a full strategic review 
of the EUGS itself or, if that is now not possible, 
at least a “Mid-Term Review of 
Implementation”, is equally important. Both 
exercises can be run simultaneously, and they are 
obviously closely interlinked – but distinct.  
 
Whatever documents Member States now agree 
to produce, the most important thing is that they 
focus strictly on what they are really willing to do. 
There’s no point in producing new guidelines that 
capitals are not actually intending to apply. We 
need good strategy and we need it to be 
implemented.  
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